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1 Introduction
In December 1996 chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, warned investors that stock
prices were \unduly escalated" and reected \irrational exuberance". After these comments
prices fell temporarily, but the market soon picked up its momentum again. It seems that the
irrational and exuberant investors were very reluctant to abandon the `escalator': the US stock
market, represented by the S&P500, has increased by 31%, 27% and 20% annually in the years
following 1996. During the same period, another remarkable trend was the steady increase of
market volatility. For example, the percentage of trading days with absolute market returns
over 1% has increased from 13.9% in 1996, to 29.6%, 28.8% and 37.2% in 1997, 1998 and 1999
respectively.
Clearly, these facts present a serious challenge to traditional economic models, based on rational
expectations, utility from consumption and risk averse behavior. Within this class of models
rapidly increasing prices and high levels of volatility are simply impossible, given the mild
increase of dividends and aggregate consumption during the last decades. In this paper we
propose an equilibrium model that retains all the assumptions of the traditional approach,
except that we introduce agents with loss aversion over wealth, according to prospect theory of
Kahneman & Tversky (1979). We derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium prices and
nd that an economy with loss averse investors can support a prolonged surge in asset prices,
accompanied by a sharp increase of volatility.
Prospect theory was proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) as a descriptive model for decision
making under uncertainty, given the strong violations of the traditional utility paradigm observed
in practice. In experiments Kahneman & Tversky (1979) found that people are concerned about
changes in wealth, rather than the level of wealth itself. Moreover, individuals treat gains and
losses relative to their benchmark dierently: the pain of a loss is felt much more than the payo
of an equivalent gain. Furthermore, in the domain of gains people are risk averse, while they
become risk seeking in the domain of losses.
Kahneman and Tversky quantied these empirical ndings in prospect theory: individuals max-
imize an S-shaped value function, which is convex for losses and concave for gains relative to
the benchmark (or threshold). We denote agents who maximize this value function as `loss
averse'. The optimal investment strategy of loss averse investors and the impact of these strate-
gies on equilibrium prices are obviously relevant for the eld of nancial economics. However,
a complete economic analysis has been hampered by the odd shape of the value function: it
does not possess the standard mathematical properties of concavity and dierentiability. Hence,
traditional optimization methods can not be applied to solve the investment problem.
Recently however, Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2000) solved the investment problem of loss averse
investors in complete markets. As might be expected, the results of Berkelaar & Kouwenberg
(2000) show that loss averse agents prefer more risky assets if their wealth increases above the
benchmark. Due to their risk seeking attitude towards losses, the loss averse agents also increase
their risky asset holdings if wealth drops below the benchmark. In this case the loss averse agents
aim to maximize the probability of beating the benchmark. We can summarize these results as
follows: loss averse agents are momentum traders above their threshold (buy if prices go up)
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and contrarians below (buy if prices go down).
Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2000) consider a partial equilibrium setting: the asset prices are given
exogenously and not inuenced by the trading activities of the loss averse agents. In this paper
we study the eect of loss averse investors in an equilibrium setting: markets have to clear and
prices are determined endogenously. Our continuous-time economy is populated by a group of
normal risk averse agents and a group of loss averse agents. We assume that all investors in the
economy have a power utility function over intertemporal consumption. The normal agents also
have power utility over terminal wealth at the planning horizon, while the loss averse agents
maximize the prospective value of terminal wealth.
We rst show that the riskfree rate and the market price of risk (or Sharpe ratio) are constant
in this economy, due to the identical utility function over intertemporal consumption for both
groups of agents. This corresponds to the situation in a benchmark economy with normal agents
only, and hence loss aversion does not inuence the riskfree rate and the Sharpe ratio. Next
we derive a closed-form solution for the equilibrium price of the risky asset, also denoted as the
stock. In sharp contrast to the interest rate, the stock price is quite dierent in the presence of
loss averse agents.
As wealth is rising above the threshold, the loss averse investors become less risk averse and drive
up the stock price by following a momentum strategy. Hence, in good states of the world the
equilibrium stock price is much higher than in a benchmark economy with normal agents only.
Simultaneously, the stock price becomes increasingly sensitive to dividend changes, which is
reected in an increasing level of volatility. The expected return on stocks is also an increasing
function of the state of the world, given the constant market price of risk. Consequently, a
booming market is quite likely if the wealth of the loss averse agents ends up above their
threshold.
In bad states of the world, where the wealth of the loss averse agents falls below the threshold, the
equilibrium price is no longer aected by momentum trading. The loss averse agents switch to
a contrarian strategy, as they are aiming to beat the threshold. Consequently, they support the
falling price if the state of the world gets worse. The price level is stabilized, at a relatively high
level compared to the benchmark economy. The volatility and mean return are low. Eventually
however, at some very bad state of the world, the loss averse agents run into solvency problems
and can no longer support the price level. From that point onwards the stock price drops down
rapidly, while volatility jumps up.
Summarizing, the equilibrium price in an economy with loss averse agents shows an interesting
variety of patterns, ranging from boom til bust. Our model may explain a number of known
empirical facts, that are hard to explain in the traditional consumption-based framework. For
example, the equity premium in our model is time-varying. In bad states of the world prices tend
to bounce back up, as loss averse agents with wealth below the threshold support the market.
In good states of the world, prices tend to drift upwards even faster due to the decreasing risk
aversion of loss averse agents with wealth above the threshold.
It is precisely this mean-averting force of decreasing risk aversion that might explain the \un-
From Boom til Bust: How Loss Aversion Aects Asset Prices 3
duly escalated" stock prices observed by Alan Greenspan in 1996. Moreover, the subsequent
rally of stock prices and rapidly increasing volatility in 1997, 1998 and 1999 are consistent with
the equilibrium eects of loss aversion found in this paper. Earlier papers by Campbell &
Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang & Santos (2000) have already pointed out that a model
with (stochastically) varying risk aversion can increase the volatility of stock returns, relative to
the underlying consumption data. As investors want to be compensated for the increased volatil-
ity, this also raises the expected excess return on stocks, hence resolving the equity premium
puzzle.
There is an interesting connection between our model and the multi-period, innite horizon
model of Barberis et al. (2000). One can interpret our setting as a detailed, one-period snapshot
of their multi-period aggregate model. As the model of Barberis et al. (2000) includes multiple
evaluation dates, the loss averse investors have to update their benchmark level each period.
The main conclusion of Barberis et al. (2000) is that a sluggish updating rule for the benchmark
level will increase the volatility of the stock returns. We conrm in this paper that loss averse
investors who are ahead of their benchmark indeed drive up the stock price, the mean return
and volatility.
Apart from this supporting role in the equity premium discussion, our paper makes a clear
contribution to the nancial-economic literature itself. We provide closed-form solutions for the
equilibrium prices in an economy with heterogeneous agents, whereas Barberis et al. (2000) have
to rely on aggregation, a piecewise linear approximation of the value function and simulations
in order to calculate asset prices. We provide a detailed micro-economic analysis of the eects
of loss aversion and heterogeneity on asset prices, based on our closed form solutions.
Other literature on loss aversion and asset pricing includes Benartzi & Thaler (1995) and Gomes
(2000). The pioneering work of Benartzi & Thaler (1995) introduces the concept of loss aversion
in an investment context and addresses the equity premium puzzle. They rely on a partial equi-
librium setting and numerical solutions. Gomes (2000) also analyzes the eect of loss aversion
in a partial equilibrium setting. Gomes (2000) solves a one-period model with two states of
the world completely and relies on simulations in more general settings. Moreover, he calcu-
lates equilibrium prices numerically in a market microstructure model without consumption,
production or dividends.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our continuous-time economy,
inhabited by normal and loss averse agents. We present the optimal consumption and investment
policies of the agents and state the market clearing conditions. In Section 3 we derive closed-
form solutions for the interest rate, market price of risk and stock price in the economy. We
analyze the main properties of the equilibrium prices. In Section 4 we investigate the additional
eect of dierences in initial wealth and thresholds among the loss averse agents. We discuss
the relevance of our results for the literature on the equity premium puzzle in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
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2 Economic Setting
2.1 The Economy
In this section we formulate the Lucas (1978) pure-exchange economy in a continuous-time
framework. We consider a nite horizon, [0; T ], economy, which is populated by loss averse
agents and normal agents with constant relative risk aversion.
1
There is a single consumption
good and other quantities (e.g. prices and dividends) are measured in units of this good. We
assume that the agents trade one riskless bond and one risky stock continuously in a market
without transaction costs. The bond is in zero net supply, while the stock is in constant net
supply of 1 and pays out dividends at the rate Æ(t), for t 2 [0; T ]. We assume that the dividend
rate follows a Geometric Brownian motion:
dÆ(t) = 
Æ
Æ(t)dt+ 
Æ
Æ(t)dB(t); (1)
with 
Æ
> 0 and 
Æ
> 0 constants.
The equilibrium processes of the riskless money market account S
0
(t) and the stock price S
1
(t)
are the following diusions, as will be shown in Section 3:
dS
0
(t) = r(t)S
0
(t)dt; (2)
dS
1
(t) + Æ(t) = (t)S
1
(t)dt+ (t)S
1
(t)dB(t);
where the interest rate r(t), the drift rate (t) and the volatility (t) are adapted processes
(possibly path-dependent).
As the market is complete, these price processes imply the existence of a unique state price
density (or pricing kernel) (t), given by
(t) = exp

 
Z
t
0
r(s)ds

Z(t); (3)
where Z(t) denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of a change of probability measure dened
by
Z(t) =
dQ
dP
= exp

 
1
2
Z
t
0
(s)
2
ds 
Z
t
0
(s)dB(s)

; (4)
and (t) = ((t)  r(t))=(t) denotes the process for the market price of risk (Sharpe ratio).
Alternatively, we may write the state price density process as
d(t)
(t)
=  r(t)dt  (t)dB(t); (0) = 1: (5)
1
All stated processes are assumed to be well-dened and satisfy the appropriate regularity conditions. For
technical details the reader is referred to Karatzas & Shreve (1998).
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The pricing kernel (t) relates future dividend payments Æ(s); s 2 (t; T ] to today's stock price
S
1
(t):
S
1
(t) =
1
(t)
E
t

Z
T
t
(s)Æ(s)ds

; (6)
The state price density process will therefore play an important role in deriving the equilibrium
prices.
2.2 Preferences, Consumption and Endowments
The asset pricing literature traditionally focuses on rational and risk averse agents with constant
relative risk aversion:
V
CRRA
(x) =
1

x

; for  < 1; x > 0 (7)
where x usually represents consumption or wealth. Note that the power utility function (7) is
increasing and strictly concave and hence agents are assumed to be risk averse.
Over the past 30 years psychologists have found compelling evidence that people treat gains
and losses dierently, and in particular that losses loom larger than gains. This behavior was
formalized by (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) in a descriptive framework for decision-making under
uncertainty, known as prospect theory. Recently, the behavioral aspects of decision-making have
received a lot of attention in the nancial literature. Benartzi & Thaler (1995), Gomes (2000),
and Barberis et al. (2000) try to explain the equity premium puzzle with loss aversion, while
Odean (1998) focuses on the disposition eect.
2
Prospect theory was originated by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) who presented a number of
choice problems to students and university faculty and found serious violations of expected
utility theory. The main conclusions from these experiments are that people care about changes
in wealth rather than the absolute value of wealth itself. Moreover, people care about small
risks and they are risk seeking in the domain of losses. These ndings are formalized in prospect
theory: economic agents maximize an S-shaped value function that is concave for gains, convex
for losses and steeper for losses than for gains:
V
LA
(x) =

 A (   x)

L
; for x  
+B (x  )

G
; for x > 
(8)
where A > 0 and B > 0 to ensure that V
LA
() is an increasing function and 0 < 
L
 1,
0 < 
G
 1. An illustration of the value function can be found in Figure 1.
Critical for the value function is the reference point  distinguishing gains and losses. This
reference point may represent the status quo of the investor (e.g. his current assets) or an
aspiration level. Another reasonable reference point may be some liability: an investor concerned
2
The disposition eect refers to the tendency of investors to sell winning investments too soon and hold losing
investments too long, see e.g. Shefrin & Statman (1985).
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with his balance sheet might only experience a loss as the value of his assets falls below the value
of his liabilities. Odean (1998) uses the original purchase price of an asset as reference point. We
interpret the reference point as an aspiration level throughout and assume that it is constant.
Another important nding of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) is that individuals apply decision
weights that over- or underweight the true probabilities. In order to study the investment prob-
lem under loss aversion we refrain from using subjective decision weights and assume that agents
maximize expected values rather than prospective values. This assumption is also made by Bar-
beris et al. (2000). Consequently, we model loss averse agents as expected utility maximizers
with the utility function given by the value function (8) of Kahneman & Tversky (1979).
We assume that a proportion  of the agents in the economy is normal and that the remaining
proportion (1  ) is loss averse. Each normal agent is endowed at time zero with initial wealth
W
1
(0), while each loss averse agent is endowed with W
2
(0). For both groups of agents we dene
a non-negative consumption process c
i
(t) and a process for the amount invested in stocks 
i
(t),
for i = 1; 2. The wealth W
i
(t) of the agents then follows the process:
dW
i
(t) = r(t)W
i
(t)dt+ ((t)  r(t))
i
(t)dt  c
i
(t)dt+ (t)
i
(t) dB(t); (9)
for i = 1; 2; 8 t 2 [0; T ]:
As in the case of asset prices, today's wealth can be related to future consumption and terminal
wealth through the state price density process (t):
W
i
(t) =
1
(t)
E
t

Z
T
t
(s)c
i
(s)ds+ (T )W
i
(T )

; (10)
The agents derive utility U
i
(c
i
(t)) from intertemporal consumption in [0; T ] and utilityH
i
(W
i
(T ))
from terminal wealth at the planning horizon T . The individual planning problem for each agent
then is:
max
c
i
;
i
E
h
R
T
0
U
i
(c
i
(s))ds+ 
i
H
i
(W
i
(T ))
i
s.t. dW
i
(t) = r(t)W
i
(t)dt+ ((t)  r(t))
i
(t)dt  c
i
(t)dt+ (t)
i
(t) dB(t);
W
i
(t)  0; for i = 1; 2; 8 t 2 [0; T ]:
(11)
where 
i
is a constant scaling parameter for i = 1; 2.
We assume that all agents have constant relative risk aversion over intertemporal consumption,
U
i
(c
i
(t)) = V
CRRA
(c
i
(t)) for i = 1; 2. The normal agents also have power utility over terminal
wealth, H
1
(W
1
(T )) = V
CRRA
(W
1
(T )), while the group of loss averse agents maximizes the value
function over terminal wealth, H
2
(W
2
(T )) = V
LA
(W
2
(T )). By assuming a common power utility
function for intertemporal consumption, we can isolate the inuence of loss aversion over terminal
wealth on asset prices. The motivation for assuming loss aversion over terminal wealth only, and
not over intermediate wealth, is that people evaluate their investment portfolio infrequently. The
planning horizon T can be interpreted as the rst evaluation date for investment performance.
The evaluation frequency is a crucial notion in loss aversion. How often do investors evaluate
their performance? As Benartzi & Thaler (1995) point out people le taxes each year and many
From Boom til Bust: How Loss Aversion Aects Asset Prices 7
institutional investors are evaluated annually by regulating authorities. An evaluation period of
one year seems very plausible. Even when saving for retirement a young investor may experience
utility from gains and losses on his investments as he checks his investment account. Benartzi
& Thaler (1995) labeled the combination of loss aversion and a short evaluation period myopic
loss aversion. Our main purpose is to study the eect of myopic loss aversion on the equilibrium
stock price, the risk premium and volatility.
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions and Optimal Decisions
In equilibrium each agent maximizes his individual consumption-investment problem, while the
markets for the riskless security and the stock have to clear at each time t 2 [0; T ]. Moreover, it
follows from Walras law that aggregate consumption in the economy has to equal the aggregate
dividends at each time t 2 [0; T ]. Combined, this gives the following set of equilibrium conditions:
c

1
(t) + (1  )c

2
(t) = Æ(t); (12)


1
(t) + (1  )

2
(t) = S
1
(t);
W

1
(t) + (1  )W

2
(t) = S
1
(t);
where c

i
(t) and 

i
(t) are the optimal consumption and investment decisions for each group of
agents i = 1; 2 and W

i
(t) is the corresponding optimal wealth process.
The optimal policies for the group of normal agents with power utility can be derived with
dynamic programming as in Merton (1969) and with the martingale methodology of Cox &
Huang (1989). For the loss averse agents the dynamic programming approach fails, as the value
function of prospect theory is not dierentiable in the reference point. Moreover, as the value
function is also non-concave, the martingale methodology of Cox & Huang (1989) can not be
applied directly either. Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2000) extend the martingale methodology to
allow for pseudo-concave utility functions and solve the consumption-investment problem of loss
averse agents.
In the next proposition we characterize the optimal terminal wealth prole and consumption for
both groups of agents:
Proposition 1 For any state price density following the process (5), the optimal intertemporal
consumption policy c

i
(t) and terminal wealth proles W

i
(T ) of both groups of agents i = 1; 2
are
c

1
(t) = I
1
(y
1
(t)) = (y
1
(t))
1= 1
; (13)
c

2
(t) = I
2
(y
2
(t)) = (y
2
(t))
1= 1
;
W

1
(T ) = (y
1
(T ))
1= 1
;
W

2
(T ) =
(
 +

y
2
(T )
B
G

1=(
G
 1)
for (T ) < =y
2
0 for (T )  =y
2
;
where I
i
(z) denotes the inverse of the marginal utility function over consumption z = U
0
i
(x),
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and  solves f() = 0 with
f(x) =
1  
G

G

1
x


G
=(1 
G
)
(B
G
)
1=(1 
G
)
  x+A

L
(14)
and y
i
 0 are Lagrange multipliers, satisfying
E

Z
T
t
(s)c

i
(s)ds+ (T )W

i
(T )

=(0)W
i
(0), for i = 1; 2: (15)
In order to facilitate the derivation of equilibrium prices in the following sections, we additionally
use the following proposition proved by Karatzas, Lehoczky & Shreve (1990) and Basak (1995).
It provides a dierent representation of the equilibrium conditions by applying the martingale
methodology.
Proposition 2 If there exists a state price density process (t) satisfying
Æ(t) = I
1
(y
1
(t)) + (1  )I
2
(y
2
(t)); (16)
where y
1
and y
2
are Lagrange multipliers dened in (15), then the equilibrium conditions (12)
are satised by the corresponding optimal consumption and investment policies.
Before we actually derive the equilibrium prices, we will rst discuss the optimal investment
strategies of the agents. In Figure 2 we display the optimal terminal wealth prole for both loss
averse agents and normal agents. All agents have initial wealth W
i
(0) = 1 and power utility
over consumption with risk aversion  =  1. The normal agents also have a power utility
function over terminal wealth with  =  1 and no scaling (
1
= 1). For the value function of
the loss averse agents we apply the parameter values estimated by Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
(
L
= 
G
= 0:88, A = 2:25, B = 1:0), scaling factor 
2
= 10 and a threshold equal to initial
wealth,  =W (0).
Figure 2 shows that the optimal terminal wealth function of the normal agents is decreasing
smoothly from good states of the world (low (T )) to bad states (high (T )). The loss averse
agents behave quite dierently: in the good state region (low (T )) they require much more
terminal wealth than the normal agents, due to low risk aversion over gains. Their optimal
wealth function is also relatively steep in good states. In average and bad states up to =y
2
,
the loss averse agents try to keep their wealth above the threshold  and as a result the wealth
function becomes quite at. In very bad states, from =y
2
onwards, this strategy is no longer
feasible and terminal wealth suddenly drops to zero.
Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2000) demonstrate that the optimal investment strategy of loss averse
agents can be considered as a combination of a growth strategy and a binary option. The growth
strategy produces the steep increase of terminal wealth in good states of the world. In average
and bad states the loss averse agents try to maximize the probability that their wealth stays
above the threshold  and for that purpose they hold a binary option. This binary option pays
o  if the state of the world (T ) is better than =y
2
and nothing otherwise. Finally, in states
worse than =y
2
the loss averse agents end up with zero wealth.
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Figure 3 displays the optimal fraction invested in stocks as a function of wealth W (t) for both
groups of agents, at an intermediate point in time t < T .
3
The normal investors dedicate a
constant fraction of wealth to stocks. For the loss averse agents the portfolio weight of stocks is
minimal in the neighborhood of the threshold , while it increases sharply at both high and low
levels of wealth. At high levels of wealth this policy is driven by low risk aversion over gains,
while at low levels of wealth the probability maximizing strategy (i.e. the binary option) results
in an increasing stock fraction.
We conclude that loss averse investors follow a momentum strategy (buy high, sell low) at high
levels of wealth relative to their threshold, around the threshold they become more risk averse,
while they switch to a contrarian strategy (buy low, sell high) if wealth drops considerably
below the threshold. In the following sections we will investigate the impact of this investment
behavior on equilibrium prices.
3 Equilibrium with Loss Averse Agents
In this section we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium prices in an economy where a
fraction  of the agents is normal and the remaining fraction 1  is loss averse. As a rst step,
it is convenient to derive the equilibrium state price density as a function of aggregate dividends
by inverting equation (16). Given the stochastic process for the state price density in (5), as a
second step we can infer the equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk. The following
proposition summarizes these general results:
Proposition 3 In any economy with 0    1 equilibrium exists and the state price density is
given by
(t) = (v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
 1
, (17)
where
v(y
1
; y
2
) = (y
1= 1
1
+ (1  )y
1= 1
2
)
 1
: (18)
The equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk processes are constant:
r(t) = (1  )(
Æ
+ 1=2(   2)
2
Æ
); (19)
(t) = (1  )
Æ
.
An important conclusion from Proposition 3 is that the interest rate r and the market price of
risk k are constant in equilibrium. Moreover, the fraction of loss averse agents in the economy
does not aect the interest rate and the market price of risk. Hence, in our setup the presence
of loss averse agents will only have impact on the price level of the stock, on its drift rate  and
3
In order to derive the optimal investment strategy as a function of wealth (instead of the pricing kernel ),
we assume that the riskless rate r is constant and the stock follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant
mean and volatility. See Berkelaar & Kouwenberg (2000).
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volatility . Note however, that the mean and volatility always have to move in lockstep due to
the constant market price of risk.
The constant interest rate and market price of risk arise due to the assumption that both groups
of agents share an identical power utility function over intertemporal consumption. Although
this economic setup leads to some inexibility, a major advantage is that we can derive closed-
form solutions for the prices and hence fully analyze the economic problem at hand. Basak (1995)
and Basak & Shapiro (1999) impose equivalent assumptions in order to study equilibrium with
portfolio insurers and value-at-risk regulation respectively. Without an identical utility function
over consumption for both groups of agents, we would have to resort to numerical techniques as
in Grossman & Zhou (1996).
4
Given the state price density of Proposition 3, we can derive the equilibrium stock price from
the equilibrium conditions (12). Once a closed-form expression has been obtained, the drift rate
 and volatility  of the stock price process follow straightforwardly from Ito's lemma. Below we
rst present the equilibrium price in a benchmark economy with normal investors only ( = 1),
before we consider our general results with loss averse agents:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium price of the risky asset in an economy with normal agents only
( = 1) is
S
1
(t) = Æ(t)(a(t) + e
(T t)
); (20)
with
a(t) =
1

(e
(T t)
  1);  = 
Æ
  1=2(1   )
2
Æ
: (21)
The stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift rate and volatility given
by
(t) = (1  )(
Æ
+ 1=2
2
Æ
); (t) = 
Æ
: (22)
In the case of normal agents with power utility the interest rate is constant and the stock price
follows a Geometric Brownian motion, resembling the familiar Black-Scholes assumptions for
option pricing. If we additionally introduce loss averse agents ( < 1), then the equilibrium
stock price process changes quite drastically:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium price of the risky asset in an economy with both normal and
loss averse agents is
S
1
(t) = a(t)Æ(t) + y
1= 1
1
v(y
1
; y
2
)e
(T t)
Æ(t) + (23)
(1  )

e
 r(T t)
N(d
2
(Æ; t)) + (
B
G
y
2
)
1=1 
G
e
 (t)
(v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
1 
1 
G
N(f
2
(Æ; t))

4
The same holds if we would leave out consumption and only assume utility over terminal wealth.
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with
d
i
(Æ; t) =
log(
i
=y
i
) + (1  )(log(Æ(t)) + log(v(y
1
; y
2
))) +
 
r  
1
2

2

(T   t)

p
(T   t)
; (24)
f
i
(Æ; t) = d
i
(Æ; t) +

p
(T   t)
1  
G
; for i = 1; 2;
 (t) =

G
1  
G

r +
1
2

2

(T   t) +
1
2


G
1  
G

2

2
(T   t);
where 
i
solves equation (14).
5
In an economy with loss averse investors the drift rate and volatility of the stock price process are
no longer constant, which can be easily veried by applying Ito's lemma to the stock price formula
(23). Given these closed-form solutions, we will now analyze the impact of loss aversion on the
equilibrium stock price, its drift rate and volatility. It will turn out later that these quantities can
be both higher and lower in the presence of loss averse agents (relative to benchmark economy),
depending on the particular state of the world. Hence, we can not conclude much analytically
about the sign of these changes and numerical investigations are therefore required.
For our numerical examples we set the parameters of the dividend process as 
Æ
= 0:056 and

Æ
= 0:115, based on monthly S&P500 index data from 1980 up to 1999. All agents have initial
wealth W
i
(0) = 1 and power utility over consumption with risk aversion  =  1. The normal
agents also have power utility over terminal wealth with  =  1 and no scaling (
1
= 1). For
the loss averse agents we take the parameter values estimated by Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
for the value function, scaling factor 
2
= 10 and threshold  = 1.
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium price of the risky asset in the benchmark economy ( = 1) and
in a mixed economy with 50% loss averse agents ( = 1=2), at the intermediate time t = 1=2.
The price in the benchmark economy is smoothly decreasing from good states of the world (low
(t)) to bad states (high (t)). However, if loss averse agents enter the market then the price
function changes sharply. In good states of the world there is a remarkable explosion of prices.
In intermediate states the price remains quite stable on a relatively high level. Finally, in bad
states the stock price drops rapidly below the level of the benchmark economy.
The price function in the presence of loss averse agents can be explained quite well by studying
the optimal investment strategy. As pointed out in the previous section, loss averse investors
are quite tolerant to risk if their wealth exceeds the benchmark level. Hence, in good states of
the world the stock price rises sharply due to the demand pressure of the loss averse agents.
This explains the strong boom of the stock price in the left hand side of Figure 4. Figure 5 and
6 demonstrate that the drift rate and volatility of the stock return also jump up simultaneously,
due to the decreasing level of risk aversion in the economy.
5
Note that d
1
(Æ; t), f
1
(Æ; t) and 
1
are only dened and used in economies with heterogeneous loss averse agents,
see Section 4.
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In bad states with low wealth the loss averse agents switch to a probability maximizing strategy,
aiming to keep wealth above the target. This strategy (replicating the payo of a binary option)
prescribes an increasing portfolio weight of stocks as wealth decreases. Hence, in bad states the
loss averse agents follow a contrarian strategy and their demand supports the relatively high
price level compared to the benchmark economy. The mean and volatility of the stock returns
are relatively low in this intermediate region, as shown in Figure 5 and 6.
In extremely bad states of the world, the probability maximizing strategy is no longer feasible,
as it involves an increasing portfolio weight of stocks. At some point the loss averse agents will
start to diminish their stock position in order to meet margin calls and to avoid bankruptcy.
While this forced retreat from the stock market takes place, the stock price drops down quite
rapidly while both the mean and the volatility of the stock return rise. The increase of the mean
return in very bad states might seem puzzling at rst sight, but is required to lure the normal
agents into buying stocks of the distressed loss averse agents.
Concluding, we observe that the presence of loss averse agents has a remarkable impact on
the equilibrium stock price. The price function displays a volatile journey from boom til bust,
with a relatively stable price regime in between. For other parameter values we nd qualitatively
similar results, as in all cases the price movements relative to the benchmark economy are driven
by the optimal investment strategy of the loss averse agents. For example, Figure 7 shows the
equilibrium price at time t = 0:75 instead of t = 0:5. The price functions in Figures 4 and 7
have a similar shape.
Finally, we take a closer look at the stock price process by calculating the expected drift rate  as
a function of the price level S
1
(t) at time t = 0:5. Figure 8 shows that the expected stock return
in the economy with loss averse agents goes up as the price level increases above its initial value
S
1
(0) = 1. Hence, in good states of the world (high S
t
(t)) the returns are mean-averting due
to the momentum strategy followed by the loss averse investors. In intermediate states, there
is a small region where the expected return is lower than in the benchmark economy. Here the
loss averse investors stabilize prices with their contrarian strategy, while replicating the binary
option.
If the price drops further the expected return starts to increase again. This increase is due to
the gradual retreat of the loss averse agents from the market, selling their stocks to the normal
agents at a discount. Once the loss averse agents are out of the market, the expected return
goes back to the benchmark level. We conclude that stock returns in our economy with loss
averse agents display mean-aversion when prices are high and mean-reversion when prices are
(moderately) low. At rst sight, this might seem a perfect deal for investors: low prices tend to
bounce up, while high prices tend to rise further. However, volatility also rises considerably in
both cases.
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4 Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Loss Averse Agents
In the previous section we considered an economy with two homogeneous groups of agents,
normal and loss averse. Clearly, in practice investors also dier from each other in a number
of other aspects. For example, people have dierent initial wealth and this will aect their
investment decisions. For power utility though, it is a well-know fact that the distribution of
initial wealth does not aect equilibrium prices. Rubinstein (1974) and Constantinides (1982)
prove that a group of heterogeneous power-agents having dierent initial wealth but equal risk
aversion , can be represented equivalently by one aggregate power-investor.
However, in the case of loss averse agents with dierent initial wealth this result might no longer
hold. The obvious reason is that it matters a lot for a loss averse investor whether his wealth
is above the threshold or below. As we have discussed previously, loss averse investors with
wealth above the threshold pursue a growth strategy, while below the threshold they maximize
the probability of getting even. A similar argument holds if we would consider two loss averse
agents with dierent thresholds. This makes it very unlikely that an economy with heterogeneous
loss averse investors can be represented by an equivalent economy with one aggregate loss averse
agent.
In order to investigate this aggregation issue, we study an economy with two groups of loss
averse agents, who are identical except for their threshold and initial wealth. A fraction ' of
the loss averse agents has initial wealth W
1
(0) and threshold 
1
, while the remaining fraction
(1   ') has initial wealth W
2
(0) and threshold 
2
. As before, we let y
i
denote the Lagrange
multipliers of the budget equation for both groups i = 1; 2. The following proposition provides
a closed-form expression for the equilibrium stock price in the economy:
Proposition 6 The equilibrium price of the risky asset in an economy with two groups of loss
averse agents with dierent threshold 
i
and initial wealth W
i
(0), for i = 1; 2, is
S
1
(t) = a(t)Æ(t) + (25)
'


1
e
 r(T t)
N(d
1
(Æ; t)) + (
B
G
y
1
)
1=1 
G
e
 (t)
(v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
1 
1 
G
N(f
1
(Æ; t))

+
(1  ')


2
e
 r(T t)
N(d
2
(Æ; t)) + (
B
G
y
2
)
1=1 
G
e
 (t)
(v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
1 
1 
G
N(f
2
(Æ; t))

with a(t) given by (21), d
i
(Æ; t), f
i
(Æ; t) and  (t) given by (24) and 
i
as dened in (14). Note
that 
1
and 
2
are not equal in this case, due to the dierent thresholds 
1
and 
2
.
Figure 9 shows the equilibrium stock price at time t = 0:75 in an economy with loss averse
agents only, where a proportion ' = 0:5 of the agents has initial wealth W
1
(0) = 0:75 and
the other group of agents has initial wealth W
2
(0) = 1:25. As a benchmark we also show the
equilibrium price in an economy with one loss averse investor, having initial wealth 1. The
remaining coeÆcients and parameters are the same as in the previous section.
It is clear from Figure 9 that the price function in an economy with heterogeneous agents diers
from the benchmark case. In the heterogeneous economy the price level is higher in good states,
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due to the excess demand of the wealthy individuals (W
2
(0) = 1:25). This higher price level
can no longer be supported when the poor agents (W
1
(0) = 0:75) run out of funds, and hence
in moderately bad states the stock price drops below the benchmark level. In very bad states,
the agents of the benchmark economy also have to leave the market while the rich individuals
in the heterogeneous economy still survive. Consequently, the equilibrium price is above the
benchmark level again at the right end of the graph.
Figure 10 displays the volatility of the stock return in the two economies. In general, loss averse
agents increase volatility when they are above their threshold (while following a momentum
strategy) and when they leave the market in very bad states. Hence, in the heterogeneous
economy the volatility is relatively high in good states, as the rich individuals drive up prices
with their momentum trading. In moderately bad states the volatility in the heterogeneous
economy is also higher, due to the gradual bankruptcy problems of the poor individuals. Then
in very bad states, turmoil in the benchmark economy is relatively high as agents leave the
market, while the rich individuals in the heterogeneous case are still alive.
The behavior of the drift rate is similar to the volatility of the stock return, due the constant
market price of risk. We also considered a heterogeneous economy where the two groups of
loss averse agents have equal initial wealth (W
1
(0) = W
2
(0) = 1), but dierent thresholds

1
= 1:25 and 
2
= 0:75. As can be seen in Figure 11, the price function in this case is
qualitatively similar to the case with dierent initial wealth. We conclude that the aggregation
of heterogeneous loss averse agents with dierences in initial wealth or threshold is not possible.
In general, heterogeneity will tend to smooth abrupt changes of the stock price and its volatility.
However, the absolute level of the stock price and its volatility might rise, as the behavior of
some individuals is more extreme (e.g. very wealthy investors).
5 A Note on the Equity Premium Puzzle
One of the most striking puzzles in nance, is the question why, historically, the average return
on equity has been so much higher than interest rates. This fact was rst observed by Mehra
& Prescott (1985). The puzzling element is why we cannot explain this with classical economic
models assuming rationality, risk aversion, and markets without frictions. Over the last decade a
stream of literature has attempted to explain this so-called equity premium puzzle. Possible ex-
planations include market imperfections (Basak & Cuoco 1998), incompleteness (Constantinides
& DuÆe 1996), and alternative assumptions on preferences such as habit formation (Campbell
& Cochrane 1999) and loss aversion (Barberis et al. 2000).
Let us demonstrate the equity premium puzzle with some gures. Previously, we used dividend
data in our numerical experiments. However, the clearing conditions (12) state that aggregate
consumption should equal dividends. What are the equity premium and volatility of stock
returns in an equilibrium with normal agents if we use empirical data on US consumption?
Using the US annual consumption data from Barberis et al. (2000) over the period 1889 to 1985,
we observe that the average growth rate equals 
c
= 1:84% with standard deviation 
c
= 3:79%.
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Recall that the equity premium in the benchmark economy is given by    r = (1   )
2
c
and
the volatility of stock returns is  = 
c
(see Proposition 3). Assuming a risk aversion coeÆcient
of  =  1, we obtain an equity premium of    r = 0:3% and a volatility of 3:79%, if we
use consumption data. These gures demonstrate clearly that the equity premium and the
volatility of stock returns do not even come close to historically observed gures in a model
based on consumption data, power utility and a frictionless market. We could increase the
equity premium by assuming higher risk aversion, however the volatility remains the same.
The diÆculty in explaining the equity premium puzzle with traditional models mainly stems from
the fact that the volatility of consumption growth is extremely small compared to the volatility
of stock returns.
6
Recently, Campbell & Cochrane (1999) and Barberis et al. (2000) have
demonstrated that preferences with time-varying risk aversion can increase volatility. Campbell
& Cochrane (1999) focus on consumption habits, whereas Barberis et al. (2000) consider a
combination of prospect theory and the house money eect of Thaler & Johnson (1990) to
resolve the equity premium puzzle. In both models time-varying risk aversion generates time-
varying risk premia, resulting in more volatile asset prices than the underlying dividends (and
consumption).
Barberis et al. (2000) consider an innite horizon discrete-time model with intertemporal power
utility over consumption and loss averse preferences over wealth. The aggregate loss averse
investor evaluates his gains and losses at the end of each discrete-time period. As the model of
Barberis et al. (2000) includes multiple evaluation dates, the loss averse investors have to update
their benchmark level. Barberis et al. (2000) assume that the loss averse investor slowly adjusts
the threshold to realized gains and losses, not immediately. Additionally, Barberis et al. (2000)
assume that risk aversion decreases after gains and increases after losses.
7
With this particular
model Barberis et al. (2000) explain a considerable share of the equity premium puzzle.
In this paper we analyze the micro-economic eects of loss aversion on asset prices in a model with
a nite horizon, over the course of one evaluation period of the loss averse investors. Moreover,
we allow for continuous trading up to the evaluation date. Hence, our approach and aim are
quite dierent from Barberis et al. (2000). It is still an interesting question though, whether we
can explain and conrm the results reported by Barberis et al. (2000), as we have closed form
solutions while Barberis et al. (2000) rely on simulations to calculate the equilibrium prices.
Moreover, Barberis et al. (2000) assume that the value function is piecewise linear (ignoring risk
aversion over gains) and that there is one representative loss averse agent.
For illustrative purposes we also consider an economy with one representative loss averse agent,
in order to compare the results with Barberis et al. (2000). Figure 12 shows the equity premium
at t = 0 as a function of the threshold , given risk aversion  = 0, scaling factor  = 100 and
initial wealth W (0) = 1. We observe that the equity premium increases, if the initial wealth
of the loss averse investor is larger than the threshold (i.e.  < W (0) = 1). Eectively, this
situation represents an investor who has enjoyed prior gains. Similarly, as he suered prior losses
6
Even when relying on dividends, the volatility of stock returns  = 
Æ
= 11:5% does not come close to the
empirically observed volatility of 20%.
7
This is achieved by making the parameters A and B of the value function (8) depend on the time-varying
benchmark level.
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(i.e.  > W (0) = 1), the equity premium also increases. Figure 13 shows the volatility at t = 0
as a function of the threshold, which is similar due to the constant Sharpe ratio.
We may conclude that our model is able to generate a relatively high equity premium and
volatility if investors are far from their benchmark, both initially and intertemporally. These
results reinforce the conclusions of Barberis et al. (2000) on the eect of prior outcomes on the
mean and volatility of stock returns. Barberis et al. (2000) assume that the loss averse investor
adjusts his threshold each period according to a sluggish updating rule As wealth will tend
to rise above the benchmark on average, this may be compared with our results when initial
wealth exceeds the threshold. Consider Figure 12 and 13: we observe that equity premium and
volatility increase as the wealth of the investor exceeds the threshold. Similar results hold for
the equity premium.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the impact of loss aversion on asset prices. We derived closed-form
solutions for the market price (and mean and volatility) in an economy with heterogeneous
agents. Some agents are normal whereas other agents are loss averse. In good states of the
world, the loss averse investors with wealth above the threshold are momentum traders, thereby
pushing prices far above the level in the benchmark economy. In moderately bad states of the
world, the loss averse investors are contrarian, and equilibrium prices are kept relatively high
and stable. Finally in extremely bad states, the loss averse investors are forced to retreat from
the stock market in order to avoid bankruptcy, resulting in a sharp price drop.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows:
1. The riskfree rate and the market price of risk (or Sharpe ratio) are constant, as we as-
sume that both the normal and the loss averse agents have a power utility function over
consumption.
2. In good states of the world the presence of loss averse investors with wealth above the
threshold stimulates a boom in stock prices, while in extremely bad states the presence of
loss averse investors results in a sharp drop in prices. At intermediate and moderately bad
states, the presence of loss averse investors stabilizes prices at a relatively high level.
3. In general, the presence of loss averse investors increases both the mean return on stocks
and the volatility.
4. Asset returns are predictable. When prices are high, stock returns are mean-averting.
When prices are (moderately) low, stocks returns are mean-reverting.
5. Volatility is non-constant. In good states of the world an increase in prices raises the
volatility. In bad states of the world an increase in prices decreases the volatility.
We believe that our equilibrium analysis may shed light on the recent surge of major stock
markets in the world (during the late 1990s). The \irrational exuberance" that Alan Greenspan
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mentioned in 1996 might well be due to the presence of loss averse agents. Loss aversion may
result in \unduly escalated" stock prices and increasing volatility, due to decreasing risk aversion.
Moreover, our results demonstrate how loss aversion leads to a time-varying level of risk aversion,
as the wealth of loss averse investors moves relative to their threshold. We also conrm the
conclusions of Barberis et al. (2000) regarding loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle.
In our model with one evaluation period, we demonstrate that the ratio of wealth to the bench-
mark (threshold) of loss averse investors has a strong impact on the stock price, the mean return
and the volatility. Consequently, an important issue is how people update their benchmark dy-
namically through time, from one evaluation date to the other. Barberis et al. (2000) choose a
sluggish updating rule, motivated by their eort to t the equity premium with consumption
data. An interesting question for future research is how people actually update their benchmark
in practice, as the original description of prospect theory of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) only
applies to one-shot gambles.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We refer to Cox & Huang (1989) and Karatzas, Lehoczky & Shreve
(1987) for the optimal consumption and investment policies for agents with power utility. Berke-
laar & Kouwenberg (2000) derive the optimal policies for loss averse agents. 2
Proof of Proposition 2 This proof can be found in Karatzas et al. (1990) and Basak (1995). 2
Proof of Proposition 3 If we substitute the optimal consumption policies (13) into equilibrium
relationship (16), then we nd:
Æ(t) = (y
1
(t))
1= 1
+ (1  )(y
2
(t))
1= 1
= (y
1= 1
1
+ (1  )y
1= 1
2
)(t)
1= 1
; (26)
and hence the state price density in equilibrium is
(t) = (y
1= 1
1
+ (1  )y
1= 1
2
)
1 
Æ(t)
 1
= (v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
 1
: (27)
By applying Ito's lemma, we can derive that (t) follows the stochastic process below:
d(t) = ((   1)
Æ
+ 1=2(   1)(   2)
2
Æ
)(v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
 1
dt + (28)
(   1)
Æ
(v(y
1
; y
2
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 1
dB(t)
= ((   1)
Æ
+ 1=2(   1)(   2)
2
Æ
)(t)dt + (   1)
Æ
(t)dB(t):
Equating the processes (5) and (28), we can determine the constant interest rate r and the
constant market price of risk . 2
Proof of Proposition 4 The equilibrium stock price in an economy with normal agents is a
special case of Proposition 5 with  = 1 (see proof below). The drift rate (t) and volatility
(t) of the process can be derived by applying Ito's lemma to the stock price. 2
Proof of Proposition 5 The price of the risky asset can be derived from the third equilibrium
condition in (12):
S
1
(t) = W

1
(t) + (1  )W

2
(t): (29)
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Given the optimal policies of a normal agent and the process for Æ(t), we can derive:
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Similarly, we nd for the loss averse agents:
W

2
(t) =
1
(t)
E
t

Z
T
t
(s)c

2
(s)ds+ (T )W

2
(T )

(31)
= y
1= 1
2
v(y
1
; y
2
)a(t)Æ(t) +
1
(t)
E
t
[(T )W

2
(T )]
= y
1= 1
2
v(y
1
; y
2
)a(t)Æ(t) +
1
(t)
E
t
"
(T )
 
 +

y
2
(T )
B
G

1=(
G
 1)
!
1
f(T )

=y
2
g
#
= y
1= 1
2
v(y
1
; y
2
)a(t)Æ(t) + e
 r(T t)
N(d
2
(Æ; t)) +
(
B
G
y
2
)
1=1 
G
e
 (t)
(v(y
1
; y
2
)Æ(t))
1 
1 
G
N(f
2
(Æ; t));
where 1
f(T )

=y
2
g
denotes the indicator-function. Finally, by substituting (30) and (31) into
(29) we get the equilibrium price. 2
Proof of Proposition 6 Equivalent to the proof of Proposition 5, except that both groups of
agents are loss averse with dierent initial wealth (and hence dierent Lagrange multipliers y
i
)
and dierent threshold 
i
(and hence dierent parameters 
i
) for i = 1; 2. 2
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Figure 1: Value Function of a Loss Averse Agent
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This gure shows the value function of a loss averse agent. The parameters used are 
L
= 
G
= 0:88,
A = 2:25, B = 1:0, and  = 1:0.
Figure 2: Optimal Terminal Wealth
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This gure shows the optimal terminal wealth in partial equilibrium for both groups of agents: loss averse
agents (solid plot) and normal agents (dotted plot). Initial wealth equals W (0) = 1 for both groups of agents.
We assume power utility over consumption with risk aversion  =  1. The scaling factors are 
1
= 1 and

2
= 10. The other parameters used are 
L
= 
G
= 0:88, A = 2:25, B = 1:0, and  = 1:0.
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Figure 3: Optimal Fraction Invested in Stocks
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This gure shows the optimal fraction invested in stocks by a loss averse agent (solid plot) relative to the
fraction invested by a normal agent (dotted plot), as a function of intermediate wealth. The parameters are
the same as in Figure 2. The riskfree rate equals r = 0:072, the Sharpe ratio is  = 0:23, the volatility equals
 = 0:115, t = 0:5 and T = 1.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Stock Price
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This gure shows the equilibrium stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy with hetero-
geneous agents (solid plot) and the benchmark economy with normal agents only (dotted plot). Initial wealth
equals W
i
(0) = 1 for both groups of agents. We assume power utility over consumption with risk aversion
 =  1. The scaling factors are 
1
= 1 and 
2
= 10. The other parameters used are  = 0:5, 
L
= 
G
= 0:88,
A = 2:25, B = 1:0, and  = 1:0. Furthermore we assume 
Æ
= 0:056 and 
Æ
= 0:115, and t = 0:5, T = 1.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Drift Rate
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This gure shows the equilibrium drift rate of the stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy
with heterogeneous agents (solid plot) and the benchmark economy with normal agents only (dotted plot).
The parameters are the same as in Figure 4.
Figure 6: Equilibrium Volatility
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This gure shows the equilibrium volatility of the stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy
with heterogeneous agents (solid plot) and the benchmark economy with normal agents only (dotted plot).
The parameters are the same as in Figure 4.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Stock Price
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This gure shows the equilibrium stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy with heteroge-
neous agents (solid plot) and the benchmark economy with normal agents only (dotted plot). The parameters
are the same as in Figure 4, except that t = 0:75.
Figure 8: Equilibrium Drift Rate as a Function of the Stock Price
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This gure shows the equilibrium drift rate as a function of the stock price in our economy with heterogeneous
agents (solid plot) and the benchmark economy with normal agents only (dotted plot). The parameters are
the same as in Figure 4.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Stock Price with Heterogeneous Loss Averse Agents
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This gure shows the equilibrium stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy with hetero-
geneous loss averse agents (solid plot) and an economy with one loss averse agent (dotted plot). The initial
wealth of the agents in the heterogeneous economy are W
1
(0) = 0:75 and W
2
(0) = 1:25 respectively. The loss
averse agent in the benchmark economy has initial wealth equal to 1:0. The other parameters are the same
as in Figure 4, except that t = 0:75 and ' = 0:5.
Figure 10: Equilibrium Volatility with Heterogeneous Loss Averse Agents.
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This gure shows the equilibrium volatility of the stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy
with heterogeneous loss averse agents (solid plot) and an economy with one loss averse agent (dotted plot).
The initial wealth of the agents in the heterogeneous economy areW
1
(0) = 0:75 andW
2
(0) = 1:25 respectively.
The loss averse agent in the benchmark economy has initial wealth equal to 1:0. The other parameters are
the same as in Figure 9.
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Figure 11: Equilibrium Stock Price with Heterogeneous Loss Averse Agents
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This gure shows the equilibrium stock price as a function of the pricing kernel in our economy with heteroge-
neous loss averse agents (solid plot) and an economy with one loss averse agent (dotted plot). The threshold
of the agents in the heterogeneous economy are 
1
= 1:25 and 
2
= 0:75 respectively. The loss averse agent
in the benchmark economy has a threshold equal to 1:0. The other parameters are the same as in Figure 9.
Figure 12: Initial Equity Premium as a Function of the Threshold
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This gure shows the initial equity premium as a function of the threshold  for a representative loss averse
agent ( = 0). We assume power utility over consumption with risk aversion  = 0. The scaling factor is

2
= 100. The other parameters used are 
L
= 
G
= 0:88, A = 2:25, B = 1:0, and  = 1:0. Furthermore we
assume 
Æ
= 
c
= 0:0184 and 
Æ
= 
c
= 0:0379, and t = 0, T = 1.
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Figure 13: Initial Volatility as a Function of the Threshold
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This gure shows the initial volatility as a function of the threshold  for a representative loss averse agent.
The parameters are the same as in Figure 12.
